The Breakdown Nobody Saw Coming
In early December 2025, thousands of passengers at India’s major airports faced mass cancellations without prior warning. Flights vanished from departure boards. Call centres failed. IndiGo, the airline responsible for over 63% of the country’s domestic air traffic, had entered an operational collapse.
On December 5 alone, more than 1,000 flights were cancelled. Across the first week of December, the total crossed 2,000. This disruption followed the full enforcement of revised Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) — a policy change that had been formally notified in January 2024 and reached its critical Phase II enforcement stage on November 1, 2025.
The new rules increased the required weekly rest for pilots from 36 to 48 hours, expanded the definition of night duty, and capped night landings at two per week. IndiGo, despite two years of regulatory lead time, had not scaled its crew planning to match. As a result, many pilots were no longer eligible to fly on key segments.
A Known Rule Mishandled
The changing of the FDTL provisions could hardly have been termed abrupt in fairness. The clarifications had come from that body of the DGCA of the Republic of India, which seemed dated 2024, when it had gone by the short scrum in the trial court and had set the clock closer to other practices worldwide.
Phase I, consisting of primary amendments, was promulgated by DGCA India in early 2024. Phase II had been enacted from 1 November 2025, stipulating night flight times and increases in rest periods. Additionally, from winter with fogging and high operational ground delays, stricter stocktaking in isolation compounded with IndiGo’s other liability under its tight schedule configuration.
A Network Built for High Utilisation
IndiGo operated over 2,200 flights daily and flew more than 300 aircraft before the crisis. Its lean operations were built around high asset utilisation and quick turnaround times. But the same approach made its system vulnerable to sudden crewing constraints.
Smaller carriers with lower frequency and more redundancy adapted more quickly. IndiGo did not. On-time performance at major airports dipped as low as 8.5% on December 5. Refunds rapidly climbed, with the airline issuing over ₹827 crore (approx. $92 million) in compensation by the second week of December.
Shares of parent company InterGlobe Aviation fell more than 16% in that period—and over 20% across six consecutive trading sessions—wiping out more than ₹34,000 crore (approx. $4.1 billion) in market capitalisation.
Inside the Passenger Experience
Bare minimum communication between the passengers had taken place. There were some who received no notification till they arrived at the airport. Some even claimed to have received no info at all. Most were left to scramble for rebooking at the eleventh hour, which often seriously cost them in their pockets. In a few pathetic scenarios, passengers resorted to hiring private airliners for some urgent personal or business appointments.
The whole disturbance of frequent air travel was unfolding before the public’s eyes on social media. The link showed scores of people streaming on with time stuck in the overbearing presence of mass airlines. Crowded every corner, long rows, and various hordes of puzzled souls slowly threading their way across the three major cities – Delhi, Mumbai, and Bengaluru. Things were exacerbated by the airline being known for punctuality, which quickly turned into ambiguity and frustration for the restlessness of the fleeting public.
The Regulatory Response
India’s civil aviation regulator issued formal show-cause notices to IndiGo’s CEO Pieter Elbers and COO Isidre Porqueras on December 6, seeking an urgent explanation. The DGCA and Ministry of Civil Aviation then took emergency steps to stabilise operations.
Fare caps were placed on key routes to prevent price exploitation. For now, the Indian Ministry of Civil Aviation has given clearance to the FDTL rules for IndiGo to substitute some provisions, like rest hours and a definition of night, with a revised structure running till February 10, 2026.
While these interventions helped recovery, they triggered new questions.
Was the Crisis Avoidable?
Multiple pilot associations, including ALPA India, publicly alleged that IndiGo’s leadership had underprepared for the rule changes. Some labelled the crisis as “deliberately manufactured” to pressure the government into relaxing fatigue-related norms.
[Unverified] These claims have not been independently substantiated but were widely reported by national media.
The DGCA has initiated a full review into IndiGo’s planning and crisis response protocols. It remains unclear whether punitive action will follow.
A Moment of Global Relevance
A single misalignment during regulation led to a level of airline wreckage. The panic in the aviation world highlighted the potential risks of one carrier benefiting from the undue prevalence in a large aviation market. Indian LCC IndiGo carried many more passengers around the country than all other Indian airliners collectively.
The arrogance underlying such a concentration came to light only with the latest regulatory issue. The event of the present standoff shows how the incessant cycles of utilisation in such high-frequency, low-margin systems worldwide may face a case of increasing potential risks during stricter global crew regulations.
Communications in Crisis
Throughout the disruption, IndiGo was slow to issue clear public updates. Its mobile app crashed repeatedly. Customer service lines were unreachable. Delayed messaging left passengers without clarity, compounding the reputational fallout.
Modern airline operations require a digitally resilient communication infrastructure. Fast, structured alerts and proactive passenger information are non-negotiable during disruptions. IndiGo’s absence of these tools deepened the fallout.
Where Things Stand
By December 9, IndiGo had scaled back up to over 1,800 daily flights. The airline reported a recovery in on-time performance, claiming 75% OTP by December 7, with targets to stabilise fully between December 10 and December 15. Full recovery was expected by February 10, in line with temporary regulatory concessions.
DGCA’s formal review remains ongoing. Passengers affected continue to receive refunds. The company has not issued a detailed public action plan for long-term operational reform.
The crisis was not just about policy. It was about preparedness.