The Meeting That Set the Tone

In early January 2026, former U.S. President Donald Trump sat down with senior executives from major oil corporations at a closed-door session in Washington. The agenda was bold: open up Venezuela’s vast oil reserves to Western investment once more, with a call for a staggering $100 billion commitment. The timing was deliberate. Political upheaval had recently unseated Nicolás Maduro’s long rule, creating what some in the West see as a narrow window of opportunity to reclaim energy interests in a country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world.

For Trump, the pitch was straightforward; Venezuela needed capital, and U.S. companies needed new oil. But ExxonMobil’s CEO, Darren Woods, struck a different chord. He told the room—and Trump—that Venezuela remained “uninvestable”.

That single word quickly became a headline.

Venezuela’s Oil Wealth and Its Collapse

Venezuela holds approximately 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, more than any other nation. Yet its oil production, once over 3 million barrels per day in the late 1990s, now hovers around 700,000 barrels daily, according to OPEC’s 2025 annual report. Years of nationalisation policies, lack of investment, and crippling sanctions have hollowed out the state-run oil company PDVSA, leaving much of the country’s production infrastructure in disrepair.

While Chevron and a few other companies have managed to maintain a limited presence through waivers and negotiated agreements, ExxonMobil exited long ago, after having assets seized in 2007. Woods reminded the room of that history. Legal challenges are still underway, with Exxon seeking billions in compensation through international arbitration.

For a company that has already seen its assets expropriated twice, the idea of returning without legal reform remains implausible.

The $100 Billion Gamble

Trump’s proposal wasn’t just about oil extraction—it was about rebuilding Venezuela’s entire oil infrastructure. Pipelines, refineries, export terminals, and upstream operations would need a complete overhaul. The proposed $100 billion figure reflects both the scale of deterioration and the ambition to restore Venezuela to its former production levels.

But where would that money come from?

No firm has made a public commitment. Chevron expressed a conditional interest but offered no numbers. European oil majors were absent from the meeting. Energy analysts from Wood Mackenzie estimate that full restoration of Venezuela’s oil sector to even 2 million barrels per day would require at least $50–70 billion and several years of sustained political and economic stability.

What Investors Are Seeing

To investors, Venezuela remains a high-risk environment. Political transition alone does not guarantee legal protections, enforceable contracts, or institutional stability. The IMF does not currently forecast macroeconomic stability for Venezuela before 2028, pointing to unresolved debt defaults and a lack of monetary controls.

Exxon’s rejection of the pitch reflects the kind of long-term brand and operational risk that institutional investors are no longer willing to overlook, even in exchange for access to massive reserves. That caution is spreading. Sovereign wealth funds and private equity investors have largely avoided direct exposure to Venezuela since the early 2010s.

Meanwhile, oil prices remain volatile. Brent crude is trading at $82 per barrel as of January 2026, still influenced by geopolitical flashpoints in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Any large-scale new supply from Venezuela could shift those balances—but only if production actually materialises.

Energy Geopolitics and Global Strategy

The issue of Venezuela is not only talked about but also debated in the corporate boardrooms. The matter is of strategic importance for the US, China, Russia, and OPEC+. If the US were to re-engage in Venezuela, it would probably be seen as a counterweight to China’s already substantial investments in Latin America, mainly through the Belt and Road Initiative and other linked programmes.

OPEC is also a party to the issue. A scenario where sanctions are lifted in Venezuela, and the country becomes a hub for foreign investments, could lead to disruptions in the production agreements and quotas. Even though Venezuela is formally an OPEC member, it has not been fulfilling its production quota for years. The return to production could cause a market glut, leading to the weakening of the dominance of Saudi Arabia and other major producers.

Hence, there is friction in the global oil hierarchy. With the formation of new partnerships, the old players are compelled to re-evaluate their stances. The U.S. policy toward Venezuela might be a sign of the resource diplomacy shift that is less about ideology and more about building stable supply chains.

Chevron’s Calculated Openness

Chevron, unlike Exxon, did not outright reject the opportunity. The company has maintained limited operations in Venezuela through joint ventures and negotiated exemptions during periods of heightened sanctions. Executives have publicly stated that if contractual and regulatory frameworks improve, they would consider increasing their footprint, possibly doubling production.

That strategy is not without risks. Chevron’s exposure remains minor relative to its global operations, giving it flexibility. But it also faces reputational pressure. Entering or expanding operations in a volatile country during a political transition can draw scrutiny from shareholders, regulators, and civil society organisations.

Supply Chain and Pricing Implications

If Western oil firms return to Venezuela, the market will react. Infrastructure upgrades would take years, but traders and analysts would begin pricing in future supply. This could soften long-term pricing forecasts, especially if Venezuela resumes exports to the U.S., Europe, and Asia.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Venezuelan crude is particularly suited to Gulf Coast refiners, who adapted to its heavy-sour profile before sanctions ended imports. If access resumes, it could reduce reliance on Canadian and Middle Eastern sources.

In Asia, where energy demand continues to grow, particularly in India and Southeast Asia, any new low-cost supply could be welcomed—if the political risk premium is priced correctly.

What to Watch Next

The key variable is stability. Without judicial reform, debt restructuring, and a credible roadmap for commercial law enforcement, no amount of oil will attract sustained capital.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are multilateral institutions that could one day become pivotal in the implementation of recovery programmes, but only with political agreement. At the moment, oil firms are in a very uncertain situation as they do not have visibility in the market.

In the second quarter of 2026, another get-together is anticipated, which could include European players. The moves of TotalEnergies or BP are being followed closely by the industry analysts to see if they release any comments. Their current quietness implies that the political circumstances are still not viewed as